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Defendant/Appellant.

Supplemental Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
The State submits this supplemental brief pursuant to this Court’s
October 27, 2014, order notifying the parties of the transfer of this matter to
this Court from the Court of Appeals and setting the deadline for
supplemental briefing.

See Appellate Docket.

The appeal challenges

convictions for theft, two third-degree and two second-degree felonies;
attempted theft, a third-degree felony; and theft by deception, a
second-degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-405 and -406
(West 2004). This supplemental brief is limited to Point I of the State’s brief
and Points I and II of Defendant’s opening brief in the Court of Appeals
involving the sufficiency of the evidence. By email sent October 28, 2014,

defense counsel stated his intent not to file supplemental briefing in this
matter.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF
BOTH HIS FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE THEFTS
A. Defendant’s failure to marshal the evidence significantly
affects, but is not a barrier to, appellate review of his
sufficiency challenge.
At Point IB. of its responsive brief, the State argues that Defendant’s
failure to properly marshal the evidence should prevent appellate review of
his sufficiency arguments. Aple.Br. 24-25. The brief was filed twenty-eight
days before issuance of State v. Nielsen, in which this Court reconciled its
previous marshaling decisions and repudiated the default notion of
marshaling in favor of the traditional principle which embraces marshaling
“as a natural extension of an appellant's burden of persuasion.” 2014 UT 10,
¶¶33-44, 326 P.3d 645.

Accordingly, the failure to marshal no longer

forestalls appellate review, but it greatly undermines the credibility of claims
of insufficient evidence. Id.
Defendant’s failure to marshal the evidence in this case indicates the
overall weakness of his sufficiency challenge. He carries the burden of
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identifying the relevant evidence put before the jury and demonstrating
why, when viewed most favorably to the verdict, it did not support any of
his convictions. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶13, 25 P.3d 985. But instead of
properly marshaling the evidence, or presenting a detailed discussion of it,
Defendant recites some of the evidence in his fact statement, then simply
reargues the evidence favorable to his position while ignoring unfavorable
evidence.

His presentation completely overlooks much of the relevant

evidence.
For example, neither Defendant’s facts nor his insufficiency
arguments make any mention of the fact that when he met with the victims,
they believed he had been appointed to represent them. See, e.g., Aplt.Br.
5-40.1 The victims’ point of view is critical to the deception charge, which
involves false impressions that are “likely to affect the judgment of another
in the transaction.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (West 2004). It is equally
relevant to the extortion charge because it would affect the victims’ view of
Defendant’s threats concerning the quality of performance to be expected
from appointed counsel.

All the victims believed that Defendant had already been appointed
as their counsel when they met with him. R460:22-25; R461:129-30, 217-19;
R462:42-48, 70, 114-15.
1
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Defendant’s sufficiency arguments also ignore the uncontested
evidence that he misappropriated four of the victims’ applications for
appointed counsel before the judge could review them. R458:65-68, 89-90;
R463:115-16; Aplt.Br. 24-41. This unauthorized act demonstrated deception
because it prevented the victims “from acquiring information likely to
affect” their “judgment in the transaction.” Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(5)(c).
Accordingly, the State maintains its position that Defendant has failed
to carry his marshaling burden.

Aple.Br. 24-25.

That failure does not

prevent appellate review of his claim, but it greatly undermines the
persuasiveness of his sufficiency arguments. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 42 (“[A]
party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence to support a
verdict will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal
if it fails to marshal.”).
B. The parallel circumstances surrounding the multiple victims
are integral to consideration of Defendant’s sufficiency claims.
The parties’ appellate briefs have presented the circumstances
surrounding Defendant’s charged conduct in a compartmentalized format,
largely dictated by the number of charges and the numerous appellate
issues. However, a global view of the parallel circumstances involving all
the victims provides a necessary perspective for review of Defendant’s
sufficiency challenges.
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The victims in this case were, in essence, a captive audience. All were in
court on pending criminal matters, all anticipated receiving appointed
counsel, and all were sent to speak with the public defender. Defendant was
the only public defender contracted with the county. R463:98. All the
victims were in need, and all were vulnerable to some degree. They had
been criminally charged, and most had been in jail. Those in jail were
anxious to be released the same day they spoke with Defendant. R460:24;
R461:86-87, 91; R462:97, 116, 119. They were in varying states of financial
stress and suffered from various stressors external to their criminal situation,
including alcohol and medical problems, the financial and personal
repercussions of being away from jobs or home, and an inability to provide
for themselves or for their families. R458:20-21, 71; R460:24, 45; R461:75-76,
86-87, 91, 106-10, 203-05, 276-77; R462:44-48, 97, 116, 119; R463:103.
Defendant had access to these victims by virtue of his contract as the sole
public defender for Garfield County. R458:7-8; R463:95, 98, 128.

In each

case, Defendant met with the victims after they had applied for appointed
counsel but before any decision was made.

R458:80; R460:20-25;

R461:126-30, 217-19; R462:42-44, 58, 70, 114-15. Notwithstanding that fact,
each victim believed that Defendant had been appointed at their counsel
when they spoke with Defendant.
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R460:22-25; R461:129-30, 217-19;

R462:42-48, 70, 114-15. Each met face-to-face with Defendant in a closed
room of the courthouse, and Defendant broached the subject of retained
counsel with the victims, asking about their assets or finances. R458:20-21,
34-35, 43-46, 71; R460:23, 29-30; R461:84-90, 95, 220-23; R462:10-12, 38, 42- 43,
58, 62, 70, 114-15. He did not disclose to the court or the prosecutor that
there were undisclosed assets excluded from the victims’ applications for
counsel. Instead, he succeeded in convincing each individual to retain him
on the spot and finalized the deals by preparing bills of sale and promissory
notes or, with Burke, charging his father’s credit card.

R460:30, 38-39;

R461:91-93, 114, 211, 221-22; R462:11-12, 43-44, 49-52, 117-18.
Defendant’s conduct amounts to in-person solicitation, which is a
concern in the legal profession. Utah R. Prof. Conduct 7.3. Under the best of
circumstances, direct, in-person solicitation of prospective clients “is fraught
with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching.”
Id., Comments 1 & 2. The circumstances carry an inherent potential for
abuse, subjecting the prospective clients to persuasion likely to overwhelm
their judgment. See id.
That concern is especially relevant to the disturbingly similar
circumstances facing the victims in this case. The victims were subjected to
“the private importuning” of a “trained advocate in a direct interpersonal
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encounter.”

Id., Comment 1.

They were not simply listening to an

unsolicited sales pitch; facing significant stress from their criminal situations,
they were unexpectedly faced with a lawyer insisting that they needed
counsel and had to decide immediately whether or not to retain his services.
The circumstances reasonably suggest that the victims would find it difficult
to fully evaluate what action would suit their own best interests.
Further, they were being asked to purchase the very services they
believed they were qualified to obtain for free. Defendant did not ask the
victims to decide between his services and those of another, less-qualified
defense attorney. Rather, he represented that the likely outcomes he could
obtain for the victims would vary depending on whether he represented
them as retained or appointed counsel. Moreover, the services at issue were
the same services covered by Defendant’s contract with the county. With the
exception of the potential federal matters that never arose with regard to
Burke, each of the victims retained Defendant to defend against their state
criminal charges.
The jury had to evaluate the exchanges between Defendant and the
victims in light of these common circumstances to determine whether
Defendants’ acquisition of the victims’ property occurred by means of
deception and extortion. Aple.Br. 22-48. Viewed most favorably to the
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verdict, the circumstances amply demonstrate that Defendant targeted and
took advantage of the victims and that his representations were deceptive.
Defendant’s duty to the victims would be the same whether they
became clients by appointment or by retainer. “An appointed lawyer has the
same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations
of loyalty and confidentiality….” Utah R. Prof. Conduct 6.2, comment 3. He
owes the same duty of competence and diligence as well as the same duty of
disclosure. See id. Rule 1.1 (requiring competent representation); id. Rule 1.3
(requiring diligent and prompt representation). He also has a duty to both
clients and prospective clients to avoid false or misleading communication
about his services. Id. Rule 7.1 & Comments 1 & 2.
Accordingly, whether he was appointed or retained, Defendant had
an ethical duty to represent his clients to the best of his ability.

The

outcomes of the victims’ cases did not depend on whether he was appointed
or retained as counsel. It is uncontested that Defendant never told the
victims as much. Because both the prosecutor and the judge testified that
they would handle cases the same whether defense counsel was appointed
or retained (R463:99, 113, 159), the jury could reasonably decide that any
difference in the outcomes that Defendant suggested would necessarily
derive solely from his own action or inaction. The jury could also reasonably
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determine that Defendant’s representations regarding his services were, at a
minimum, misleading and made solely for Defendant’s own profit. This is
especially true for those matters in which, after being retained, he disposed
of the victims’ applications for counsel before they could be reviewed by the
judge. R458:65-68, 89-90; R463:115-16.
The commonalities of Defendant’s interactions with all the victims
provide an added perspective for review of Defendant’s sufficiency claims,
reinforcing that there is ample evidence to support a theft conviction for each
of the five victims on all charged alternatives. See Aple.Br. 21-48.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant’s
convictions.
Respectfully submitted on November 26, 2014.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General

_________________________________
KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that in compliance with rule 24(f)(1), Utah R. App. P., this
brief contains 1,734 words, excluding the table of contents, table of
authorities, and addenda. I further certify that in compliance with rule 27(b),
Utah R. App. P., this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced
typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in Book Antiqua 13 point.

_________________________________
KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on November 26, 2014, two copies of the Brief of Appellee
were  mailed ☐ hand-delivered to:
Gary W. Pendleton
301 East Tabernacle, Suite 207
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 628-7086
Also, in accordance with Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, a
courtesy brief on CD in searchable portable document format (pdf):
 was filed with the Court and served on appellant.
☐ will be filed and served within 14 days.

_________________________________

-11-

